

## Risk-Based Approach to AML/CFT

Richard Chalmers
Financial Services Authority
London



## **Background**

- □2003 revision of FATF Recommendations provide, for first time, explicit recognition of the risk-based approach (RBA)
- Multiple references to ML/FT risk and risk management
  - Application of standards to financial institutions
  - Extent of CDD
  - Nature of institutions' internal controls
  - Scope of supervision
- □It is not mandatory to apply RBA, except when dealing with higher risks



## Risk within the Financial System

### **■Some scope to limit or not apply standards:**

- To a particular financial activity or type of institution "in strictly limited and justified circumstances, and based on a proven low risk of money laundering..."
- To entities "when a financial activity is carried out by a person or entity on an occasional or very limited basis...such that there is little risk of money laundering..."
- DNFBPs, and money or value transfer services (R12, R16 and SRVI) cannot be exempted entirely from the requirements, but may apply measures (e.g. R5) on a RBA



## CDD Risk Principles (R.5)

- ☐ Financial institutions should apply each of the CDD measures, but may determine the extent of such measures on a risk sensitive basis, depending on the type of customer, business relationship or transaction
- ☐ The measures should be consistent with any guidelines issued by competent authorities
- ☐ For higher risk categories, financial institutions must perform enhanced due diligence
- ☐ In proven low-risk situations, countries <u>may</u> decide that financial institutions can apply reduced or simplified measures



## **Internal Controls (R15)**

- □ Development of "appropriate" policies, audit procedures and training
- ■Type and extent of measures dependent on
  - AML/CFT risk
  - Size of business
  - Geography
  - Environment



## **Supervision (R23, 24, 29)**

- Application of relevant "Core Principles" necessary for banks, insurers and securities companies (but these principles recognise RBA)
- □Other financial institutions to be supervised on risk-sensitive basis
  - Except that money or value transfer services or currency exchanges services must be registered/licensed and subject to effective compliance monitoring
- **■DNFBP** to be monitored for compliance on risksensitive basis
  - Except that casinos must be licensed, regulated, supervised and subject to "fit and proper" tests



## **Some Challenges**

☐ For many countries the RBA is new and untested ☐ There is relatively little documentation to assist countries to implement the RBA ☐ There is no clear agreement on what in fact the **RBA** involves ☐ Very few external assessors have practical experience of structured risk-based frameworks ☐ Financial institutions are unclear as to what the authorities are expecting □ Consequently, there are inconsistencies in expectations and understanding



## Addressing the Challenges

- □FATF has established "Electronic Advisory Group" (reporting to WGEI)
- □ Joint public/private sector project
- □Terms of reference
  - Undertake fact-finding on current initiatives on RBA
  - Identify the key elements of the RBA
  - Produce guidance for publication
- □ Draft paper circulated for consultation in April 2007
- **□**Guidance paper expected for June 2007



## **Benefits of the RBA**

- ☐ It requires institutions to engage with AML thoughtfully
- ☐ Institutions can focus on real AML/CFT risks (rather than rigid checklist compliance) which allows for:
  - Better risk mitigation
  - Better cost-benefit
- □ Flexibility to adapt to risks that change over time
- Less inconvenience to the majority of legitimate customers
- More buy-in by financial institutions' staff
- No single blueprint for the launderer to discover and find a way around
- Institutions are better placed to assess their own individual ML/TF risk exposure



## Risk often seen as two dimensional




Measures for "normal" risk customer





# In practice it has multi-dimensional components





## **Challenges of Implementation**

Institutions will need to build expertise in ML/FT risk analysis
Potential diversity of RBA practice means that institutions and regulators will need to make greater efforts to identify and disseminate good practice
Basic legal obligations must be in place to avoid a poorly implemented RBA leading to ineffective practices
Institutions may be reluctant to change from current practices
Transitional costs may arise from the need for institutions to invest in IT, training, etc to move over to a RBA
Front line personnel may prefer to work on a checklist basis, but this is difficult to reconcile with RBA
There may be distinct challenges over the RBA for cash-based economies



- Clear understanding by authorities of the ML/FT vulnerabilities and risks within the jurisdiction
- Laws and policies that
  - concentrate efforts towards business activities, customers, products, delivery channels and geographic areas that are assessed as high risk for ML/FT
  - reduce them where such risks are assessed to be low
  - Require institutions to tailor procedures to address risks
- Good flow of information on risks, including from the authorities to the regulated sector
- On-going co-operation between public and private sectors
- ☐ Firm commitment to RBA by all stakeholders



- Regulatory and supervisory policies that:
  - Operate by reference to an assessment of
    - the AML/CFT risks faced by institutions; and
    - the effectiveness of their risk management systems
  - Reflect the importance of engagement by senior management
  - Give increased attention to institutions that engage in high-risk activities
  - Are consistent and transparent in their application
  - Require CDD procedures, monitoring of customers and transactions, and staff training to be consistent with RBA



### **■**Sanctioning policies and procedures that

- Recognise that an effective RBA cannot mitigate all risks
- Encourage effective implementation of RBA through proportionate and consistent sanctions
  - Avoid fear that institutions will be sanctioned when they have acted responsibly and implemented appropriate internal systems and controls, even if not all risks have been mitigated
  - Focus on institutions that have poorly conceived or weakly implemented systems and controls




#### ■ Financial institutions that:

- Carry out an assessment of ML risks that will result in risk management programme involving
  - application of appropriate and proportionate CDD when entering into a relationship
  - ongoing due diligence
  - Appropriate control environment
- Recognise that risks may only become evident once the customer has begun conducting transactions, making on-going monitoring of transactions an essential component of a reasonably designed RBA

#### **Basel CBB WG model**



#### Risk Assessment Link to the AML Risk Management Programme





## Limitations to the RBA

#### □Certain minimum issues must be in place

- Customer identification
- Knowledge of the intended business relationship
- Ongoing CDD
- Transaction monitoring
- Record-keeping
- Suspicious transaction reporting
- Freezing and sanctions orders



## Costs of the RBA

- **Expensive to set up and maintain systems**
- □Complex modelling for large and diverse institutions
- □Involves significant senior management time
- □ Application of measures is less easy to quantify and monitor than check-list
- □Risk analysis is open to challenge
- □Poor initial risk analysis can be very costly in terms of legal and reputational risk

## FSA.

## **Example of Risk-Based Supervision: UK**

- "ARROW" is the name given to the risk-based approach to front-line supervision.
- Advanced Risk-Responsive Operating frameWork.
- It not only provides the risk metrics, but also specifies the processes used to identify, record, analyse and mitigate risks.
- Applicable to supervision generally, not simply AML/CFT
- Two components:
  - ARROW Firms framework
  - ARROW Themes framework

### **The Risk Basis**



- Basis of the risk assessment is the threat to FSA's statutory objectives
  - Maintaining confidence in the financial system
  - Promoting public understanding of the financial system
  - Securing the appropriate degree of protection for consumers
  - Reducing the extent to which it is possible to commit financial crime

#### The ARROW Risk Model





- Impact
  - The amount of harm that would be done to FSA's statutory objectives if the event happens
- Probability
  - Likelihood of the event happening
- Ratings are high-level and largely subjective
  - low / medium-low / medium-high / high


## Impact/Probability Scores



- ☐ First stage is to determine the impact score for the firm.
  - Essentially a measure of the overall size of the firm, calculated primarily on the basis of numerical data (assets, customers, funds under management).
  - Supervisors may input manual overrides
- ☐On the basis of the impact score, decision taken as to whether or not the firm needs a Full ARROW or ARROW Light assessment.
- ■Next stage is to make an initial assessment of probability.

## Proportion of firms in each impact category





#### **Models of Firm Supervision**



- Low impact firms:
  - "Small firms" approach no relationship manager
  - Remote monitoring only no routine on-site work
- Medium-low impact firms:
  - "ARROW Light" approach
  - Reduced scope assessment ("core areas")
  - Normally only around 1 day on-site visit
- Medium-high impact firms:
  - ❖ "Full ARROW" approach full scope risk assessment
- High impact firms:
  - "Close & continuous" approach full scope risk assessment
  - On-site work conducted throughout supervisory period

#### New firm probability risk model



	Environment	Business Model	Controls	Oversight & Governance		Other Mitigants	Net Probability
	Environmental Risk	Customers, Products & Markets	Customer, Product & Market Controls	Control Functions	Management, Governance & Culture	Excess Capital & Liquidity	Customer Treatment & Market Conduct
		Business Process	Financial & Operating Controls				Operating
		Prudential	Prudential Risk Controls				Financial Soundness
	Business Risks		Controls	Oversight & Governance			

- 10 high-level 'risk groups'
- Combination of inherent business risks, specific controls and overarching governance
- AML risk included within controls and governance
- Capital / liquidity mitigates prudential risk only

#### New firm probability risk model (continued)




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Risk	Customers, Products & Markets	Customer, Product & Market Controls	ions	ulture		Customer Treatment & Market Conduct
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Envii	Prudential	Prudential Risk Controls	Con	Ma	Excess Capital & Liquidity	Financial Soundness
Business Risks		Controls	Oversight & Governance			

#### Risk types (horizontal rows):

- Customer treatment and market conduct
- Business process / operating risk (including AML)
- Prudential risk

#### New firm probability risk model (continued)






#### Aggregation:

- Across rows "multiplicative" approach (to give net probability)
- Vertically average (to give summary scores)

#### New firm probability risk model – calibration 1






#### Example Firm A

- Above average business risks; poor controls; poor oversight & governance (neutral environment and capital / liquidity position)
- Summary scores = Medium-high
- Net probability scores = High (problems compound)

#### New firm probability risk model – calibration 2






#### Example Firm B

- Very high risk appetite; excellent controls; excellent oversight & governance (neutral environment and capital / liquidity position)
- Summary scores = High (business risk) / Low (controls and O&G)
- Net probability scores = Medium low (risk acceptably controlled)

#### **The Firm Assessment Process**



- Periodic assessments (1-4 years) plus ongoing monitoring
- "Validation" senior / independent review and challenge



#### Thematic work



- ☐ As well as supervising individual firms, the FSA engages in so-called "thematic work". ☐ This is done in relation to issues that go beyond an individual firm, perhaps affecting an industry sector, or the markets as a whole. ☐ Set up a specialist project team, which would analyse the issue centrally, and take action accordingly. ☐ Analysis often involves visits to a sample of firms, to gauge the size of the problem in the industry as a whole. ☐ As with firm-specific issues, the risk is measured in terms of impact on FSA's objectives and the probability of harm occurring. ☐ Can undertake thematic mitigation, e.g.: "Dear CEO" letters
  - Rules changes